Appendix A:
Required Review Elements (by Interagency Prescribed Fire Policy)

Seasonal severity, weather events, and on-site conditions leading up to the wildfire declaration.
Central Nevada has been in a prolonged drought. The PJ was drought stressed and a cooler than normal spring resulted in a delayed green-up and growth of the PJ. Weather was not unusual for the time of year even though ERCs and 1000h TLF were in the 90th percentile. There were no significant or unusual winds observed between the time of ignition, throughout the implementation and to wildfire declaration.

Actions taken leading up to the wildfire declaration for consistency with the Prescribed Fire Plan. On the morning of the 13th a reconnaissance flight showed that the fire had gone outside of the project boundary but was not showing appreciable active fire behavior. A decision was made to hike people in to the slop-over and secure it as required by the holding and contingency plan. The RXB and trainee did not declare an escape since they felt confident that with some hand work the slop over could be put out. By the time a crew was able to get into the area the fire outside of the project boundary became active. The holding specialist requested bucket drops but there was a delay since the water source had not been prepared. The RXB2, RXB2t and FIRB decided that there was still not a need to declare the prescribed fire a wildfire because in their experience it was likely the fire would die overnight. The sentiment expressed by the comment, "The fire kept giving us hope, every time you thought it was done it became active again" was pervasive. They discussed the possibility of using the House Canyon Road as a contingency to burn off from, a concept that had not been developed as part of the contingency plan. The RXB checked on availability of a hotshot crew and requested an additional engine as identified in the contingency plan.

Through the morning of June 14, contingency actions continued. Assignments where given to secure slop-overs. At 1600 the fire was active outside of the project boundary. The RXB2 conferred with the District Ranger about converting it to a wildfire due to location and not having enough resources. The fire was declared a wildfire at approximately 1900.

An analysis of the Prescribed Fire Plan for consistency with Interagency Policy
The Elkhorn II Escaped Prescribed Fire Review Team reviewed the Prescribed Fire Burn Plan and National Environmental Policy Act documentation completed July 27, 2007. The plan was developed by an RXB2 trainee and signed by a qualified RXB2. These persons also implemented the prescribed fire as the Burn Boss and Trainee.
The team found that the plan met most policy requirements with 2 exceptions:

1) The plan had a project map but did not include a vicinity map. The Interagency Prescribed Fire Guide requires a project map and a vicinity map.
2) There is no documentation on the results of the test fire. The Interagency Prescribed Fire Guide requires the test fire results be recorded.

The Elkhorn 2 prescribed fire plan (in line with IA prescribed fire policy) required that the test fire be located in a representative location and in an area that can be easily controlled. The review team found that the decision by implementation personnel to place the test fire where they did was based on vegetation which most represented the project area, predicted wind direction and subsequent desired ignition pattern. There was some confusion by the FIRB and trainee as to where the project boundary was. They consequently ignited the test fire very close to the project boundary in an area that could not be easily controlled.

An analysis of the prescribed fire prescription and associated environmental parameters.
Prescription parameters included low, desired and high ranges of weather, fuel moisture conditions and fire behavior parameters consistent for prescribed fires in Pinyon/Juniper. The fire behavior narrative addressed the inability of the BEHAVE modeling program to accurately predict fire behavior in Pinyon Juniper by describing a fire behavior that would exhibit flame lengths greater than predicted and torching of trees.

The fire was ignited under high fire intensity environmental and fire behavior prescription parameters. The Ignition and resulting fire behavior allowed met the prescribe fire plan objectives.

During ignition operations on the 12th the prescribed fire stayed within the environmental prescription parameters. On the 13th of June the minimum humidity reached 5% which was 3% below prescription parameters. The duration was short (1hr) and ignition operations had not been implemented for that day.

Approving line officer's qualifications, experience, and involvement.
The review team found the District Ranger was qualified to sign the Elkhorn 2 prescribed fire plan

Qualifications and experience of key personnel involved.
The team found that all personnel involved in the Elkhorn 2 prescribed fire were qualified for the positions held during implementation.

The burn plan preparer and technical reviewers were qualified at least at the complexity level of the prescribed fire.

Summary of causal agents contributing to the wildfire declaration.

Lack of a clearly defined defensible boundary described in lessons learned section of this report.

Unexpected fire intensity and behavior as described in the Fire Behavior Analysis in Appendix B.