



LODGE FIRE
WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION
JUNE 23, 1985

BOARD OF REVIEW

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INTRODUCTION

The Lodge Fire on the Warm Springs Reservation began in mid-afternoon on June 23. Six individuals were injured while trying to suppress the fire. At the time of this report (7/24/85) the injuries have resulted in one fatality.

At the request of the Portland Area Director, a Board of Review was formed with the objective to "Develop the facts around the incident and why were the injured people on the fire." This was interpreted to mean "Develop the sequence of events from the time the fire started until the people were overrun by the flames and to attempt to determine what may have initiated suppression efforts by the injured people." At the request of the Agency Superintendent the sequencing was expanded to cover the period through the time the Class II fire team assumed control of the fire. Although the review includes the ignition of the fire, our report intentionally avoids the cause of the fire. Should there be any questions on this subject, detailed information may be obtained from the Warm Springs Agency Investigator's report.

The chronological portion of the report is a composite of radio logs from BIA Forestry's Fire Management Section as well as the Warm Springs Tribal Police log which includes Tribal Fire and Safety. In addition to the logs, the report has been supplemented with witness statements from the following individuals.

Walter Main, BIA Special Officer
Robert Harned, BIA Forest Manager
Jerry Huff, Tribal Fire and Safety
Dan O'Brian, BIA Fire Management Officer
BIA Initial Attack Personnel
Lee Lomis, IHS Service Unit Director
Kipp Morris, Director Lodge Security
Bob Dispennett, Lodge Security Officer
Bruce Yoe, Lodge employee
Chris Still, Tribal Police Officer
Tribal Police Dispatcher
Raymond Guardado, Class II Incident Commander
Joe Brent, USFS Redmond Coordinator

The report establishes an order of sequence and known times based on documented radio logs. This portion of our report is believed to be very accurate. The portion of the report based on witness statements are also believed to be in the correct order of sequence but the times have been estimated and denoted with an asterisk (*). We found that the witness statements corresponded so closely with each other and with the radio logs, that we believe these estimated times are general within plus or minus two minutes of actual time of occurrence.

Based on the agreement between the witness statements and radio logs, the review team has a relatively high degree of confidence in the overall accuracy of our report.

In reviewing the fire behavior portion of this report, it must be remembered that what is discussed is probable fire behavior. Inputs used in the calculations are based on observations taken at locations some distance from the fire sight. Nevertheless analysis shows that at the site at which the injuries occurred that flame length and fireline intensity were such that control was beyond any direct attack capability of experienced hand crews or equipment.

The final part of the report covers safety aspects considered by the review team. Again, our conclusions are based on various sources of information, and represent our honest attempt to determine the "why" of the objective.

Chronological Report
of the
Lodge Fire, #25
Warm Springs Reservation
June 23, 1985

- *1500 Fire ignited near lodge hamlet area.
- *1510 Lodge employee, Bruce Yoe was in hamlet area and reported fire to lodge by telephone. Yoe also phoned Dean Seyler at Tribal Fire & Safety and BIA Fire Management.
- 1512 Dean Seyler reported fire to police dispatcher and requested tone-out (fire alarm through radio system). BIA Fire Management dispatched E-31, a 200 gallon, one ton pumper with Philip Selam and Tony Thompson.
- *1513 BIA Fire Management dispatched a second (un-numbered) 200 gallon, one ton pumper with Vicki Stafford and Lamont Brown. (New unit not equipped with radio.)
- 1513 Tribal Fire & Safety dispatches R-28, a 250 gallon pumper with a three man crew from Warm Springs.
- *1513 Lodge owned brush truck which was stationed at village is staffed by lodge employees and engages fire in hamlet area.
- 1516 BIA Fire Management requests dispatch of helicopter from Noisey Creek Fire to Lodge Fire.
- 1516 Police dispatcher issues second tone-out. Fire is reported to be threatening lodge.
- 1518 Lodge staff has manned E-220, a 1,000 gallon tanker owned by Tribal Fire & Safety which is stationed at hamlet. E-220 staff informs police dispatch that fire is 2-3 acres in size and moving towards lodge with winds 5-10 mph from south-southwest.
- *1520 Lodge brush truck leaves hamlet enroute to lodge to assess fire situation.
- 1522 Police officer Chris Still is several miles west of lodge and enroute to lodge area.
- 1523 Tribal Fire & Safety dispatch pumper 230 from Simnasho to lodge.
- *1524 Lodge brush truck arrives at lodge.
- *1526 Lodge employees & volunteers proceed downhill from lodge to attack head of fire.

1526 BIA Fire Management dispatched E-27, a 200 gallon, 3/4 ton pumper to fire with Dan O'brian, N. Main and E. Median.

*1527 Lodge security chief, Kipp Morris arrives at lodge on E-220.

1528 Tribal Fire & Safety R-28 arrives at hamlet and request dispatch of E-14.

*1528 Fire makes run up hill towards lodge, over running victims on sidehill and brush truck at top of hill near lodge.

1530 BIA pumper E-31 reports from village area that they are enroute to lodge to assist Tribal Fire & Safety.

*1530 Police Officer Chris Still arrives at lodge, reports presence of burn victims and requests ambulance. Seconds later observes several victims in lodge.

1534 BIA Fire dispatcher records radio traffic between Tribal Fire & Safety at the lodge and police dispatcher. "Fire has gone to road, and around (lodge ?) threatening building and people."

*1534 BIA pumper E-31 at lodge with new BIA pumper (un-numbered) arriving a few seconds later.

1535 Helicopter 520 enroute to Lodge Fire from Noisey Creek Fire.

*1535 Crew members on un-numbered BIA pumper observe burn victim in lodge drive way.

1536 BIA pumper E-31 reports fire all around lodge.

1537 Helicopter 520 is directed to respond with bucket.

1543 Lodge staff request police to dispatch EMT with medical unit for transport.

1544 Tribal Fire & Safety reports 6 burn victims to police dispatch.

1546 Simnasho ambulance dispatched to Lodge.

1546 USFS, Bear Springs Ranger District telephones BIA Fire Management and offers use of pumpers. One 600 gallon and one 300 gallon pumper dispatched.

1547 Robert Dahl request police dispatcher to notify Mountain View Hospital of burn victims.

1548 Police dispatch ambulance M-15 from Warm Springs to lodge.

1601 Ambulance M-228 arrives at lodge from Simmosho and ambulance M-15 arrives at hamlet from Warm Springs.

1613 Police dispatch receives request to order medivac helicopter from Emanuel Hospital in Portland.

1621 Ambulance M-15 leaves lodge enroute to Warm Springs Clinic with 3 victims and one doctor who was a guest at the lodge. Victims: Pat Ritz, Jim Johnson & Kenneth Tababoo.

1625 Ambulance M-228 leaves lodge enroute to Warm Springs Clinic with 2 victims: Jerry Falcon and Jim Gaffney.

1645 Ambulance M-228 arrives at Clinic. Witness indicate ambulance M-15 arrived at approximately the same time.

1647 Emanuel Medivac helicopter arrives at Warm Springs Clinic.

1649 U.S.A.F. 304th Air Rescue requested.

1658 BIA Engine 12, a 750 gallon pumper arrives at fire with Rich Soures.

1705 Tribal engines 14 and 220 dispatched to hamlet area.

1710 Emanuel medivac helicopter departs from clinic to Portland with one victim.

1728 Ambulance M-15 departs from clinic for Madras Airport to transport Kenny Tababoo to Portland via fixed wing aircraft.

1742 304th Air Rescue arrives at fire and redirected to clinic.

1743 Ambulance M-15 arrives at Madras Airport.

1819 Fixed wing medivac departs Madras Airport for Portland with Kenny Tababoo.

1830 BIA places fire order for class II team with Dick French in Portland Area Office.

1903 USFS Redmond Center recieved request for class II team via Region 6 Forest Service in Portland.

*1907 Raymond Guradado, Incident Commander notified of request for team.

*2300 Portions of class II team begin to arrive in Warm Springs.

*2330 Initial attack incident commander provides fire briefing for class II team.

2400 Line officers briefing of fire team. Team effectively assumes control.

FIRE BEHAVIOR REPORT - LODGE FIRE #25

WARM SPRINGS AGENCY - B.I.A.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Lodge fire began on June 23, 1985 at approximately 1505 PDT. Primary fire spread was caused by eyelevel winds that were estimated from 5 to 10 mph by an initial attack fireman. The fire burned a total of 960 acres in one burn period. This report will address the probable fire behavior that occurred between ignition time of the fire approximately 1505 PDT and 1530 PDT, the time the fire past Kah-Nee-Tah Resort. Fire behavior during this period can be considered severe as demonstrated by the attached calculated rates of spread and fireline intensities associated with this fuel and observed weather.

The fire behavior predictions in this report are derived from the TI-59 programmable calculator, the BEHAVE Fire Prediction computer system, and the Fire Behavior Analyst Field Guide.

II. TWENTY-FIVE MINUTE CHRONOLOGY

June 23 - the Lodge fire started at approximately 1505 and spread to actual observed fire perimeter located on attachments #2 and #3. The estimated perimeter at 1518 is a result of a slope (uphill) spread with a light westerly wind (see page 2 of Fire Behavior Worksheet attached). This was also the estimated perimeter as viewed by Mike Nolan on initial attack. It was also observed by Nolan at this time (1518 hr) that wind speeds increased to 5-10 mph westerly.

By 1530 the fire had just past the Lodge displaying that the fires rate of spread was rapid as calculated on the attached TI-59 Fire Behavior Worksheet and BEHAVE Fire Prediction printout.

A reconstruction of fire behavior using the TI-59 programmable calculator and a Fire Behavior Analyst field guide showed the following with the observed weather at Warm Springs.

FUEL MODEL 1

(Primary carrier of fire was cheatgrass with intermixed medusahead ryegrass)

Observed weather at Warm Springs Agency at 1500 hour on June 23 was 71 degrees F temperature and 32 percent humidity. No wind speed was recorded at this time due to inoperable anemometers. Warm Springs (elevation 1632 feet) is approximately 7 air miles SSW of Kah-Nee-Tah Lodge (elevation 1680 feet). Winds speeds were recorded at Eagle Butte Lookout (elevation 3175 feet) at 1400 hour, the speed documented was 17 mph northwesterly direction. Eagle Butte Lookout is located 3 miles SW of the lodge. On June 26, 1515 hour, I checked the hygrothermograph at Warm Springs Fire Management. I found the calibration was reading approximately 10 percent higher on relative humidity than actual

7/8/85

occurrence; therefore 22 percent RH will be used in these calculations.

FUEL MODEL 1

June 23, 1985 (1500 hour weather observations Warm Springs Fire Mgmt.)

<u>Wind Speed</u>	<u>Rate of Spread</u>	<u>Heat per unit area</u>	<u>Flame Length</u>
0	5 ch/hr	103 BTU/Ft ²	1 ft
5	119 ch/hr	103 BTU/Ft ²	5 ft
10	446 ch/hr	103 BTU/Ft ²	10 ft
15	446 ch/hr	103 BTU/Ft ²	10 ft

(Wind speed 3-5 beyond direct attack capabilities by hand crews)

(Wind speed 10-15 beyond direct attack capabilities by dozers and engines)

These output conditions suggest fire behavior was well beyond direct attack capabilities by hand crews once wind speeds of 5 mph were reached. Calculating fire spread and intensities from 1505 to 1530 with windspeeds from 5 mph to 10 mph and greater indicate spread rates of 119 ch/hr to 446 ch/hr with flame lengths from 5 feet to 10 feet and greater. Referencing the Fire Behavior chart (Attachment #1), this fire behavior that occurred on the Lodge fire between 1505 and 1530 hour with wind speeds greater than 10 mph displays that direct attacks on the head of this fire was well beyond the capabilities of mechanized equipment, dozers and engines.

It is suspected that once the head of the fire reached the draw directly west of the Lodge (see map attachment #2 and aerial photo attachment #3), the winds may have temporarily subsided lessening the fire intensities and spread rate, plus the rock slides coming down the draw, wind speeds of 0 to 3 mph with the given weather, fuel type and terrain create fire behavior that is within the limits of hand crew personnel. (See sheet #1 Fire Behavior Worksheet) This may have prompted the people to go down the hill from the lodge to suppress the leading edge. It appears once the fire reached the bottom of the draw it had the advantage of the approximate 30 percent slope and winds resumed from 5 to 15 mph westerly which immediately would create fire spread rates from exceeding hand crew capabilities and intensities that would result in the injuries that occurred to the people.

III. FIRE BEHAVIOR SUMMARY

Fire spread and intensities experienced Sunday, June 23 between 1505 and 1530 on the Lodge fire are very typical for the fuel type the fire burned in. Fire fuel moisture content of the grass fuel type was calculated at 3 percent with the given temperature and relative humidity recorded at Warm Springs BIA Fire Management Station. With this low fuel moisture, any additional driving factor (wind) will create fire conditions well beyond any direct attack possibilities by hand crews or equipment at the head of the fire. Fire spread rates and intensities can change dramatically within seconds which occurred on the hill just west of the Lodge. The above analysis suggest that the wind was the primary force for the severe fire behavior on the Lodge fire.


IV. WEATHER SUMMARY

There was no anomalous weather pattern occurring on June 23. A cooling trend had been present for the past couple of days to the 23rd, this weather activity followed a very hot and dry spell with windy conditions.

During the burn period between 1505 and 1530 PDT temperatures were in the low 70's with relative humidities in the 20 percent range. Skies were clear, zero percent cloud cover. Winds were variable from less than 5 to 15 mph from a westerly direction.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jim Roessler". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized initial "J" and "R".

FIRE BEHAVIOR Fire Characteristics Chart (Logarithmic Scale)



BEHAVE RUN
6/30/85
Fire Behavior Predictions (Fire 1)

Direct List

1) Fuel Model	1-short grass (1 ft)
2) 1-hour Fuel Moisture, %	3.0%
7) Midflame Windspeed, MI/Hr	0 5 10 15
8) Percent slope	0
9) Direction Wind Vector	0
10) Direction of spread calculations degrees clockwise from the wind vector	0 direction of MAX spread)

RUN

Midflame Wind (MI/H)	I	Rate of Spread (ch/hr)	Heat per Unit area (BTU/Sq.ft)	Fireline Intensity (BTU/Ft/s.)	Flame Length (ft)	Effect Wind (MI/H)
0	I	5	103	10	1.3	0
5	I	119	103	226	5.4	5
10	I	446	103	844	10.0	9.6*
15	I	446	103	844	10.0	9.6*

*Means you hit the wind limit

SIZE


INPUT

3) Elapsed Time, hr. .5

RUN

Midflame Wind (MI-H)	I	Area (ac)	Perimeter (ch)	Forward Spread Distance (ch)	Backing Spread Distance (ch)	Maximum Width of fire (ch)
0	I	2	17	2.7	2.7	5.3
5	I	138	148	59.7	3.3	28.0
10	I	1203	499	223.2	5.0	67.1
15	I	1203	499	223.2	5.0	67.1
	I					
	I					

Comparison with perimeter at 1518 hrc, 1525 hrc, and 1530 hrc.



Attachment #2

Estimated fire perimeter at 1518 hours, 1525 hours and 1530 hours





Attachment #3

Estimated fire perimeter at 1518 hours, 1525 hours and 1530 hours.

SAFETY ASPECTS OF LODGE FIRE

The team spent considerable time reviewing and discussing the events that lead to the injuries on the Lodge Fire. From the written statements, minutes from the Fire and Safety meeting at Kah-nee-ta, personal interviews, etc., it is the opinion of the Review Team that the injuries were a result of an attempt by well-meaning individuals to protect the Lodge, the jobs of the Lodge employees and possibly the lives of the other employees and visitors. We believe that the action was an individual effort and that no one individual directed another to take action. The observance of individuals taking action may have caused others to respond but this was voluntary responses.

The individuals were ill-equipped to take suppression action. The analysis of fire behavior indicates that once the fire crossed the small draw and began its uphill run that even heavy equipment would have been useless. These individuals attempted to suppress the fire with wet towels and sheets. Even if the suppression effort had been able to stop the fire advance below the lodge prior to it crossing the draw, it is the opinion of the Team that there were not sufficient forces present to prevent the fire from hooking around their control lines. The mid-afternoon winds and the wind generated by the fire itself produced the erratic fire behavior observed.

Fire suppression experience may have also played a role in the seriousness of the injuries. The fuels were primarily grasses which are usually totally consumed at the flaming edge. The chances of outrunning this type of fire once it begins its uphill spread are little and none. The best action would be to go back through the flames into the blackend area. One individual took this action and was less seriously injured.

The last item to be discussed is the type of clothing worn by the injured. The majority of the clothing was synthetics. This type of clothing will usually melt before it burns. It is our understanding that much of the injuries were of this nature. Suppression personnel when at all possible should wear natural fiber materials such as cotton or denim, and when available these materials should be treated with a fire resistant solution. These materials will burn, but higher temperatures are required.

Recap of safety portions of report

1. No one was directed to take suppression action. Action was taken voluntarily.
2. Individuals ill-equipped for tasks
 - a. lack of fire behavior knowledge
 - b. lack of fire suppression experience
 - c. improper or inadequate clothing

memorandum

DATE: June 28, 1985

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: BIA Director, BIFC

SUBJECT: Board of Review - Lodge Fire

TO: FILES

At approximately 1210 hours on June 24, 1985, I received a call from Marshall Cutsforth, Chief, Division of Forestry, requesting a Board of Review be established to review events concerning the Lodge Fire on the Warm Springs Reservation. This fire began the afternoon of June 23 and resulted in serious injuries to six people.

This request for a review was initiated by a call to Central Office by the Portland Area Director and Area Forester.

Because no specific direction or objective for the review was available at this time, I attempted to obtain personnel with a wide range of expertise.

The team consisted of the following:

- Charles W. Tandy - BIA Director, BIFC
Team Coordination and C.O. Representative
- Robert Webber - Bureau of Land Management, BIFC,
General Headquarters (GHQ) Fire Boss
- James Roessler - Flathead Agency, Pablo, Montana
Fire Behavior Analyst
- Stan Palmer - Bureau of Land Management, BIFC
Fire Safety Officer
- Bill Watters - Northern Cheyenne Agency, Harlan, Montana
Class II Fire Boss and Administration


At 1900 MDT on June 24, I was able to contact George E. Smith, Portland Area Forester for specific guidance on team objectives. The objectives were identified as follows:

"Develop the facts around the incident and -
why were the injured people on the fire."

I interpreted this to mean to construct a log, from various sources of information, sequencing events from the time the fire started until the people were overrun by the flames and to attempt to determine what may have initiated suppression efforts by the injured people.

The team departed Boise, Idaho, via charter aircraft at 0910 MDT on June 25 arriving at Madras, Oregon Airport at 0930 PDT. Transportation from Madras to the Warm Springs Fire management Office by Agency personnel.

The team attended the debriefing of the Class II Interagency overhead team prior to beginning the review.



APPENDIX B

BOARD OF REVIEW

ENTRANCE MEETING

6-25-85

Bernard W. Topash	Superintendent	BIA Warm Springs
Kip Morris	Director of Security/Kahneeta	
Stan Palmer	Safety Manager	BIFC-Boise, ID
R. Alex Whistler	PAO Fire Rehab	PAO
Jim Roessler	Fire Behavior Analyst	Flathead BIA
Bill Watters	Natural Resource Officer	Northern Cheyenne
Dick French	Area Prevention/Central	PAO
Charles W. Tandy	BIA Director, BIFC	Boise, ID
Robert W. Webber	Chief Branch of Field Ops	BLM,BIFC
Daniel O'Brien	Acting Fire Management Officer	BIA Warm Springs
Bob Harned	Forest Manager	Warm Springs

BOARD OF REVIEW

CLOSE-OUT MEETING

6-27-85

1300 Hrs.

1. Robert W. Webber	BLM	Boise, Id
2. Dick French	BIA	PAO
3. Will Bowker	BIA	PAO
4. Bob Harned	BIA	Warm Springs
5. B. W. Topash	BIA	Warm Springs
6. Bill Watters	BIA	Northern Cheyenne
7. Jerry Huff	Fire & Safety	Confederated Tribes of W.S.
8. Chuck Tandy	BIA	Boise, Id.
9. Kip Morris	Kahneeta	Warm Springs
10. Walter J. Main	BIA	ASO/LES
11. Stan Palmer	BLM-BIFC	Boise, Id
12. Jim Roessler	BIA-Flathead	Pablo, Mt.

APPENDIX D

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
FIRE & SAFETY DEPARTMENT, CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS
and the
BRANCH OF FORESTRY, FIRE MANAGEMENT SECTION, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
WARM SPRINGS AGENCY

INTRODUCTION

Because of the intermingling of structures and natural cover fuels on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, the objectives of the two above named organizations are inseparable; i.e., to minimize the loss of life and property as a result of uncontrolled fire. Recognizing this, we the undersigned, have arrived at the MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING for the primary purpose listed below:

1. Provide for closest possible cooperation on mutual objectives.
2. Identify the purpose and responsibilities of our respective organization.
3. Assure effective support when either organization is committed to or beyond its capacity.

To implement this program, the following information as to organizational make up is exchanged:

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES:

In areas of mutual interest, undersigned agree to the following operational procedures:

1. Dispatching
 - a. The Fire Management Section will, while equipment is available, dispatch a crew to any known forest/brush/grass/etc. fire, or to any fire of unknown character.
 - b. The Fire & Safety Department will, while equipment is available, dispatch a crew to any known building/residence/structure/etc. fire, or to any fire of unknown character.
2. Communications
 - a. Having knowledge of same, the Fire Management Section will immediately assure the Fire & Safety Department of any burning or threatened structure within the area.
 - b. Having knowledge of same, the Fire & Safety Department will immediately advise the Fire Management Section of any burning or threatened natural cover fuels within the area.
3. Burning Permits

Permits for burning of natural cover fuels, piled debris, or other flammable material will be issued only by the Fire Management Section.
4. Mutual Assistance
 - a. Suppression - When both agencies are represented at the same fire, the over-all supervisory responsibility shall lie with the agency concerned most directly with the type of fuels then actually on fire. If a structure is on fire, Fire & Safety Department will be in charge of the suppression effort. If forest and range fuels are present at a structure fire, BIA Fire Management Section will be in charge of this portion of the suppression. When Fire & Safety responds to a forest or range fire, BIA Fire Management Section will be in charge of the suppression effort. If immediate action is required, neither agency shall be limited because of the type of fuels which is burning.
 - b. Training - Each agency agrees to attend/participate/assist/etc. in those portions of the other agency's training program which have a bearing on the individual agency's efficiency.
 - c. Other - Each agency agrees to lend its support to programs of the other agency which will increase the public awareness of the hazard and destruction of fire and/or make the objectives of the MEMORANDUM possible.

The MEMORANDUM shall be effective when signed by both parties, it continues in effect unless and until either party gives sixty (60) days notice in writing to the other party.

CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS
FIRE & SAFETY DEPARTMENT

By: [Signature]
Secretary/Treasurer
By: [Signature]
Community Services Manager

Date: 7/17/84
Date: 7-16-84

BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
WARM SPRINGS AGENCY

By: [Signature]
Superintendent

Date: 7-17-84

MINUTES FROM MEETING AT KAHNEETA FIRE HALL 6/25/85

(Typed at BIFC from handwritten copy)

Fire and Safety received the call direct to W/S Fire & Safety. Bruce called and stated "Emergency, get me Dean". Dean called WSPD for a Tone Out.

Bruce Yeo

1. A little kid came to the house and told Bruce there's smoke and fire outside.
2. Bruce went outside to find the location. Smoke & fire headed towards the Kahneeta Hamlet Area on the hill.
3. Bruce ran back into the house and called Dean on the phone.
4. Bruce called dispatch for a fire truck to the Kahneeta Hamlets.
5. Bruce called fire management.
6. Bruce grabbed a shovel and ran to fight fire.
7. The Kahneeta fire trucks arrived at the Hamlets.
8. Bruce went over to Kahneeta lodge.

Robert Despennett

Mike Nolan called him & Bruce called him at the same time. When Despennett arrived at the Kahneeta fire hall, Mike was already there. The fire hall door was broke and they had to pry it open to get the pumper out. Despennett told Loren & Ed to go to Kahneeta Lodge and evaluate fire. Despennett turned his radio to Chuck?. Despennett fought fire at the Hamlets until he was told to go to the Lodge.

Loren Thorton

Ed Rouse & George came to the Lodge in Middle Parking lot by the Juniper room. At that time Despennett again asked for a size up. They told him to get the truck up there. GET THE TRUCK UP

HERE. The guests surrounded Ed. Someone was told to bring sheets out. Feremon sent people for the fire hose and the old fire hose at the Village shop. They wet the sheets down. Loren told people not to go down to the fire. Jim Johnson said "We can't stand here and do nothing" and went over the hill. The others followed. They were going to establish a perimeter around the fire hydrant. The pump wouldn't prime. They pulled the hose in and the flames overtook the one ton truck and over the top of it. George was standing on the back of the truck and when the flames singed his beard and hair. Kip Morris yelled to get the rig out of here. They opened the door and flames came in. Couldn't get the other door open. They finally pulled the rig around the corner. Everytime they radioed Ed Rouse he responded on the radio. They were going to do a perimeter around the South side, flames had already hit the building. A BIA unit came and helped prime the unit and fought with them along the road. Flames were to the Juniper room by the time Dean arrived at the scene. Ed Rouse - Jim Johnson? were approximately 75 feet down the hill. Ed Rouse did not send subjects down the hill they just followed. People were warned not to go. One Indian had shorts and moccasins on and he was told to remain.

When Bob Despennett arrived the flames had just got to the lodge and people were coming out of the Lodge in panic. Bob Despennett went into the Lodge to try to calm guests. The outside sprinklers had already turned themselves on.

When Bruce Yeo arrived he went into the Lodge and asked Garland Bruner if he was going to evacuate and he said yes. Someone told Bruce Yeo that someone was hurt out back. Bruce Yeo grabbed a wet sheet and went down. Bruce Yeo saw Bob Despennett and Mike Nolan going down and patients coming back up. Bruce did a triage of patients and went to the worst patient. Bruce did not know Ed was hurt.

The sprinkler system outside set itself off believed to be from heat from a juniper tree. One of the sprinkler systems was capped off and unusable.

When Dean Sayler arrived there was heavy smoke in the area. Someone wanted to pull the booster off Rescue 28 but Dean told them negative. Jan & Linda went to the fire to fight it. Dean went into the lodge to check the situation. The guests were leaving. A tree by the lodge was on fire. Patients started arriving and Dean

started treating them. At this time he was advised of another patient in the kitchen.

Bob Despennett told the 2 Kahneeta volunteers to go through the lodge to all of the doors and tell the guests to leave and to make sure no one was left.

Two subjects (guests) were reported to have slept through.

Despennett stated 2 girls took pass keys and were checking every room.

The Doctor and his family slept until the knock on the door woke him up and his room was full of smoke.

Someone stated that an employee had slept clear through. He woke up and wanted to know where everyone went. This shows a definite need for smoke detectors.

Chief Hoff arrived after Rescue 28 and a BIA unit and set up as coordinator. He had the truck hook up to hydrant and then Jan advised him of the bad burn subjects.

Bruce Yeo stated that most of the patients had walked up the hill. There were enough personnel to help patients. Three of the five patients walked. Assisted Jim Gafney up. Manny brought the green stretcher from First Aide room down & they brought up the worst patients.

Rob Dahl of WSPD helped us get them & treat them. Patient was hosed down with Rescue 28.

The BIA unit that was second to arrive came from the campus area believed to have been at Pi-ume-sha grounds.

BIA sent another engine and then another unit. They were trying to keep the fire from crossing the road. There was a juniper burning that was a threat to the lodge that they put out with a crew of 3. Unable to get a size up of fire.

Jerry Huff

All personnel were requested not to speak to anyone about this. There could be a lawsuit and we might have to testify.

Jerome Main

The investigation is continuing and Kip will be assisting in the interview. All news releases will be going through 2 individuals. DO NOT TALK TO PRESS. Possible 3 young boys set the fire but due to age of subjects & finances no recovery of expenses is expected. They will probably just try to scare them and make them realize the extent of damage they caused.

Discussed the patients and the fact we were still alive but 2 had no real chance. The 97% burn patient is now on a respirator to breathe. The ones that do make it will have a long recovery period of maybe up to 3 years and if they live will require skin grafts.

Life flight responded and took all patients. The Rescue 304th sent 3 or 4 helicopters so we had plenty of aircraft.

We had fantastic turnout of medical personnel. We had 5 Drs. at the Clinic. The advanced life support EMTs - 3 nurses, lab tech. The administrator also came. Each patient had his own Dr. and room.

Nothing more could have been done for them here.

Chief Hoff stated that the main thing was to keep them breathing and they needed fresh air (in short supply) more than oxygen and needed IVs started because of the loss of fluids.

It was discussed that we had no radio contact with the 304th and maybe we could find out their freq. and program it in our units.

It was discussed that we had engine 230 and the Police watching Charley Canyon.

Jefferson County Fire District standing by at highway 8 and county line at a residence.

Thanks was given to the Police Dept. for assisting in evacuation.

Discussed that residents from the Hamlets were fighting fire and that the employees should be educated.

Two problems were discussed in reference to the 1. supervisors not

attending meetings and the regulars do. 2. Supervisors show and start taking over when they haven't come to the trainings.

Jerome Main wanted to know when the BIA TOOK OVER CONTROL OF THE FIRE. Huff explained that Fire & Safety responds & stays until danger to structures are over. Huff also explained that fire management & us have an agreement of first unit response and when we respond to a grass fire we fight it until their units arrive and then it's turned over. BIA took over at arrival at the golf course & danger to structures were over.

Six of Kahneeta crew stayed over on the fire all night for hot spots etc.

It was discussed and agreed that a major problem was only one road was available to the Lodge and Hamlets. Proposed that a road needed to be built between the fire Hall and lodge. This would give 2 roads into both areas and break it into four sections to serve as fire breaks and give good access to the water tanks.

It was proposed that underground sprinklers needed to be put in place around the Lodge & Hamlets to be used in fire situations and it would not ruin the landscape. It had been proposed before for a green strip and refused, but with just underground sprinklers the landscape would not change and no maintenance would be required.

Kahneeta Fire & Safety requested a radio for the one ton. Ed Rouse felt that if they'd had better communication where they could have contacted each other no one would have been hurt.

It was requested that the 3rd ambulance be stationed at Kahneeta. Huff stated that they had not had an EMT there for the ambulance but maybe when EMT & funds were available.

It was discussed that to hook up a 2 1/2" hose direct to the hydrant it would take 5 guys to hold the hose down.

It was discussed that there was no existing protection on the Southside of the Lodge.

Sgt. Souers said he felt everyone did a hell of a job with the equipment available and we deserved a THAT-A-BOY!

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 1/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

PAGE 20 OF 50

TIME MESSAGE

1509	726	RD.
1512	PT	CRASH FIRE KAHNGETA HAVEN
1512	720	BROWN RES.
1513	R 28	CR/3
1514	7FS	HT 5166
1514	720	10.98 10.8 11.72
1515	710	—
1515	PT	728
1517	7F3-4	FIRE CAMP
1518	7F14	PIBOUT 135 H 2/2 100 E 710000
		WIND 5-10 MPH TO 5500
1522	742	—
1523	730	10.8
1528	7FS	10.97 HAVEN 0014/SICED TO
1530	7F40	—
1530	710	—
1532	7FS	—
1532	7F5	SMOKEHOUSE UNIT } EVALUATE 1ST RESP ALSO } LODGE
1534	PT	RAILED SMOKE OUT
1536	708	019
TOTAL	PHONE 3	RADIO 18

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 2/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

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TIME MESSAGE

1538	7F14	Ambulance
1539	Unrunner	Fire Man
1542	728	10.8 WCH
1543	PC	6MT & UNITS FOR TRANSPORT
1543	721-29	10.8
1544	R 22	6-VICTIMS
1545	M 228	70 R (455-455)
1547	719	10.8
1547	728	ADV. Mt. View
1548	752 10.5	- 10.8 IN AMBULANCE
1548	PC	DR. HANNING / AS NOSP
1551	PC	DR. / JIM WIRE NURSE TO CLINIC
1552	710	MADRAS AIB TO RESP. 3 STANBY
1554	710	10.98 10.39
1555	710	10.98 10.39
1601	M228	10.97 PULLEY HILL
1601	M15	HAMLETS
1601	725	10.97
1604	710	
1609	PC	

TOTAL PAGES 2 RADIO 34

BPA/756

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 3/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

PAGE 22 OF Six

TIME MESSAGE

1612	R-3	JUST LEAVING MADRAH
1613	C/I	CHOPPER AT CLINIC
1615	PC	C/H CAROL MILLER / SCOTT NATHAN
1616	C/I	SKIN HARD - CAN'T START IV - REPLY / KEEP WARM - HON
1618	DOC-3	DN CONF. TRADS W- C/I
1619	DOC-3	TO CLINIC
1621	H15	LEAVING KAHNGETA NOW W/3
1621	PC	ALL HELP TO CLINIC ✓
1624	7F1	10:15 TO AGENCY
1624	C/I	5 M SEVERE 75-100 TO BURNS 1 DOC BOARD AMBUANCE
1625	H22R	10:19 TO CLINIC
1626	—	FIRE PART 10:16 P 10:16:10
1635	H22R LF	ETA 12 MIN (1647)
1636	D22R	ETA 5 MIN
1637	708	FIRE JUMPED HAYR GOLF COURSE BEAR SPRINGS
1641	LF	304 TH ON STANDBY
1642	C/I	3 (1645)
1649	7F5	—

TOTAL PAGES 10 RADIO 53

RPM 1/14

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 4/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201	CLINIC	553-1196
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

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TIME MESSAGE

1646	LF	ETA 1 MIN	
1649	LF	LAND	PM. FLCT NRS / 304 TH RESP.
1652	PC	ZIMMER JACKSON / MIKE CLEMENTS (GOLFING)	
		CONT. TOPACK AT FM	
1654	710	10.8	
1655	R 28	GOLF COURSE	
1656	710-E12	E OF KAHNEETA	
1700	710	2 ND CHOPPER IN	
1701			
1705	14 & 220	TO HATFIELD AREA / FIRE BEHIND SIBEL	
1710	7F30	15 DR 228	J.M. LORETA JOHNSON / HAS
1713	DR.	5 - 2 ABOUT GOLF	
		ETA 18:10 / 304 TH	
1716	PC	WASCO CO SD.	
1720	PC	OSP / BEND	ON STANDBY
1710	LF	ST. CHARLES	IF WIFT OFF
226	720	MR BRUNO REC. REPUTATION	
1725	M 15	C/B	→ MARRAS AP
17	700	SHUT INFO	1 TO STANDBY KENNEDY
1734	710	FE 719	TO (KROUET M 15
1734	304	ETA - 15 MIN (1700)	
1741	PHONE 14	RADIO 70	RPH / 706

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 5/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS CLINIC	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385
PAGE 24 OF SUN

TIME MESSAGE

1735 MIS DISREGD ESCORT
1739 720 TO MAIN GATE VILLAGE WALK PROBLEM
SMOKE INVESTIGATION
1741 PC ~~TO~~ CHRIS HEE IS YOG 12-1869-
SIGNED RADIANT TCSO
1742 700 - OFFERED TO CLINIC
1742 710 CHOPPERS TO FIRE/EDINSE
1743 MIS 10.77 H-AP
1744 PC
1746 758 10.8 10.19 10/40 TO CLINIC/65306.7
1747 PC ED MANION-706
1749 PC GERRY STRONG - 415-483-0800
DONG M-CLELLAN #489
LINE UP PLANK
1749 758 CLINIC /60302.2
1752 7F7 MADRAS AP.
1753 714 10.8 FROM CLINIC TO CHOPPERS
1754 PC TAPSH / FM
1755 PC - MANNING
1757 H 725 CRUSHER - WIND BLOWS
1754 706

ITAL PHONE 23 RADIO 12 RPH / 740

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 6/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

PAGE 25 OF Sun

TIME MESSAGE

1804	MIS	LF PLANE
1805	722- ^{PC}	TIM GAGNEY - TIM JOHNSON 11 072839
		ED ROUSE - TRANS. TO MARRIAGE AP?
1806	761	(10.7)
1812	205	HAS TANK ON WCH FOR FIRE SUP IN KENNY
1813	706	11.12
1815	700	- MARRIAGE PD - 1 CHAPPEL
1816	920	10.8 10.19
1818	700	—
1818	PC	
1819	MIS	PATIENT LOADED/READY
1820	MIS	10.28 10.19 MT. VIEW
1820	719	MPOOL
824	MIS	CHOPK TO FTED
826	PC	
8	PC	JASON - F. R. HALL / 205 ACROSS FROM
1832	228	10.28 QTR-5
1832	717	11.27

TOTAL PHONE 31 RADIO 95

11/1/2006

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 7/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

PAGE 26 OF SUN

TIME MESSAGE

1833	PC	—	WACO CO
1835	720		PD
1837	PC		—
1843	719	0452	CAMERA Hit/Rev #127
1844	700		CHOPPER TO REF
1845	PC		G. STRONG 475-9512
1870	702		10-8 10-19
1848	725		—
1851	PC		KIP KAHNEGA / WALKER / DARR
1856	MIS		10-8 10-19
1856	706		—
1857	752		ENRT. BACK
1859	700		10-8 10-19 TO KAHNEGA
900	PC		LELAND JACKSON, Rt. 1 Bx 382 PENDLETON, OK. 296-4033 RUNAWAY - FEMALE WAS WARD OF COURT / PENDLETON SUSPECTED TO GO TO CT IN PENDLETON TERRITORY
903	725		10-19 DARRS #163 / 135 V
904	PC		—

TOTAL PHONE 42 RADIO 105 RPA 1796

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 8/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385
PAGE 27 OF 500

TIME MESSAGE

1907	PC	CALICA / SOWERS	
1910	G Spina	FREDRICKS - WIFE	OK TO COME IN
		TO PICK HIM UP	
1911	PC	—	
1914	PC	FLOYD BOWEN / CALVER / TABARONA	
1917	MIS	AGENCY	
1915	PC	APRESS	
1915	PC	CH. 2	
1916	E 12	TO AGENCY	
1922	725	R.D.	
1922	725	10.8	
1924	723	RAINBOW	
1925	700	10.98 10.10 10.2 10	
1926	MIS	10.19 - 11 P.M.	
1926	702	FIS	
1926	FB	HARRY PHILLIPS / C/I	
		MR. PHILIP SELASH	RY LODGE
		RE: GUYE INT.	
1931	730.721	10.8	
1931	723	10.8	
1932	R 28	10.19	

TOTAL PHONE 38 RADIO 109 RE: 11/17/86

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 9/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

PAGE 26 OF Sun

TIME MESSAGE

1733	730 721	1513	TENI 20	WILKINSON ✓
1932	PC		COMM CENTER - JANITOR	MILLIE WILSON 1161 #27
			CLOSE 10 PM INSTEAD OF 8:00	
1933	PC		KELLY VALONDEK	17 40.8
1934	E14		VILLAGE ON PORTABLES	
1935	727	10.8	10.17	125L 9882.8
1936	17115		QTR.	
1939	708		Phillip S. R.	
1941	702		PD	
1943	702		10.2	
1943	702		(SILVER) RUCCE YEO	SIMNASHO PI
1944	PC		- DAVE HARDING	-
1945	708		RIVER RM	
1946	728		10.6	
1950	723-7	10.19	10.15	2X
1950	730-21	10.8	10.17	
1953	E12		FIRE HALL	
1954	723		PO	
1955	730		PO	
1958	1728		QTRS	
1003	228			
1000	728		TO 136 - 135 L	

ITAL PHONE 43 RADIO 125 BPH / 756

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 10/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

PAGE 27 OF SUN

TIME MESSAGE

2007	702	10.8 - 10.19
2007	706	10.19
2012	PC	TO Group Home out for 15 min.
2014	701	TO HATLET 10.19
2014	7-E-1	10 8 11-15 14
2019	702	KVDOS6
2021	7FS	CLINIC
2023	721	OFF DUTY
2027	PC	RBT BULLCALF / WHI CHU 2027
2028	730	10.8
2031	702	PD UCH MAINT
2034	723	09 ⁴⁵ 22-15108 / MT WASCO / FFS
2034	723	516644368 - DISCREP STOP SIGN
2036	PC	DARREN - NIGHT OFF
2039	814	108 90.
2044	723	10.98.8
2045	730	GRANDS
2052	752	10-7
2055	7K	413
2057	762	CLIN
2057	707	CLINIC

TAL PHONE 47 RADIO 142

BPH 12500

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 11/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 6-23-81
PAGE 20 OF 20

TIME MESSAGE

2058	Plc	Dr. Patrick. P. Lee - Reed -
2059	710	which good
2102	724	-702 10-8
2103	Plc	Ben Hordson - (Yellow High Cross) -
2104	0/200	↑
2105	708-712	-714
2106	Dr. H. -	Cherie - M. H. - L. H.
2107	700-710	10-8
2108	0/708	
2109	Plc	
2110	710	
2111	708-710	10-8
2112	Plc	Dr. M. H. - M. H. -
2113	0/702	10-19
2114	708-	10-8
2115	724-707	-
2116	710-108	
2117	708-	10-10 10-7
2118	708-20-	712
2119	*708	-

TAL PHONE 51 RADIO 159 David B. H. 075

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 12/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 6-23-85

PAGE 29 OF 60

TIME MESSAGE

2132	7F5 -	2132
2133	770	2133
2134	770	10-97
2134	Med-15 -	10-97
2135	702	10-87
2137	1T	WA/EK 2523
2141	*C/I	BLACK OUT
2140	730	10-8
2140	702-714	10-8
2142	702	
2143	773	PD
2145	PC	
2148	197	10-98 10-99
2148	708	10-8 10-19
2151	708	10-7
2151	197	HQ
2154	730	MOY / KucinP
2157	702-724	2157 SD PKR109
2158	730	C/I
2159	724	2468161 COURTNEY, PAVID ALLEN
2200	228	10-8 10-98 10-13
TOTAL	PHONE 52	RADIO 179
		RPA/746

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 13/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475-6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 06.23.85

PAGE 30 OF 50

TIME MESSAGE

2202	724	10.98	10.8
2202	723	PUMPS	
2203	726	QTS	
2207	702		
2207	723	10.8	
2208	787	10.8	10.19 TO 4134 QTS
2209	720	10.87	NO AR / HENRY CITATION
2210		TOOK OUT	MANNING
2212	197	10.8	TO PETERS PICTURE
2213	702	TO 135 L	
2216	*	TOOK OUT	FIRE SHAKEL CHURCH / SHITKE CR
2217	781	- R 28	(OLD TRUCK ON FIRE)
2220	E 14	10.8	
2220		FM ON	THEIR WAY
2220	702		
2221	782	TRAFFIC	CONTROL
2224	727	10.14	TO SHITKE
2225	197	10.97	
2225	?	AT	SCENE
2228	708	10.8	
2229	714-712	SIN KAH	

TOTAL PHONE 52 RADIO 200

SPH / 256

RADIO LOG

APPENDIX F 14/14

WARM SPRINGS



TRIBAL POLICE

GROUP HOME	553-1654	FORESTRY	553-1141
MT. VIEW	475-3882	IRA'S	475-3861
JCSO	475-2201		
WCSO	296-5454	USPHS	553-1196
DR. CREELMAN	475 6055	DR. (RES.)	553-1221

DATE 062385

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TIME MESSAGE

2232	702	—	
2235	P/C	Bill. C. C. C.	
2237	702	—	
2239	700.10	Aux R.O.	
2241	197	10.98	
2243	724-702	13/727	
2245	728	10-19	
2246	V. 197	10-8	Peter Padua
2246	730	7	ERG 924
2247	923	—	
2247	730	10.8	
2248	96	KIP - REPORTS	
2251	712	—	
2256	C/I	V POOL TO #220	KHAKETA
			HAKET #140
2301	702	10.8	
2301	723	P. HAKETA	ON PORTABLE
2301	702	10.7	
2301	702	PD	
	C/I	HAKET	7FS in R. 25 to other
2304	730	AT SO TO OTHER SIDE	
TOTAL	PHONE 54	RADIO 219	SBP 1/056

COM-1

LL - Land Telephone
V3 - Verbal Message

Department of Interior
Warm Springs Agency
Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE 6-23-85

TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
1304	K-61	DISP.	Update, all lines we had are holding. Had some returns within unit, looking very good for this time of day. Rescue unit from F&S headed to Pi-mun-sha Grounds on small fire. In service to Pi-mun-sha Grounds. Two crews arrived at Fire mar - Mt Baker, Baker River. 100% mopped-up - (Stay in the area) Load of wood chips at Fire Management. Asking about Timber-red for sawite. Will need information, update on fire strong winds 25-30 m.p.h. Spots on sec 13 c 30 within the line. Grass fire hamlet Kah-noota F-31 has been dispatched hamlet - 9 villages. Let the Helicopter head over 10-11. Will second Towse out, the one Fire headed towards the lodge.	
1329	Towse out	W.S.P.D.		
1332	E-31	DISP.		
1336				
1358	E-31			
1420				
1441	DISP.	F-61		
1443	F-61	DISP.		
* 1512	Towse out	W.S.P.D.		
1516	DISP.	F-61		
1516	W.S.P.D.	"		

APPENDIX G 1/11

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE 6-23-85

U #	TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	COORDINATOR
	1521	FSS		At the scene	
	1526	F-90	Disp.	In route to Fire #25 & #26 at Kah-nee-ta Hamlet & Village Above the Teepees. (ON V-37)	
	1530	F-31	Disp.	At Kah-nee-ta will head to lodge to assist FSS	
	1534	F45		Fire has come to the road, and ground threatening building & people	
	1535	520	Disp.	In route to Kah-nee-ta Fire #25	
	1536	F-31	"	Fire all around the lodge	
	1537	520	"	Will T need the Bucket 10-4	
	1541	F-90	Disp.	Have 3 piss bags ready and some fags for Helicopter 520	
	1546	Bear Springs LL		Need any more Engines 10-4	
	1551	Fuel Tank	"	Sending 2 engines 600 gal. & 300 gal.	
	1554	520	Disp.	Be there in 20 min	
				Fire is burning East of lodge will burn in cross	
	1556	520	Disp.	wet gunn. Sacks	

APPENDIX G 2/11

LL - Landline Telephone
 V3 - Verb. Message

Department of Interior
 Warm Springs Agency
 Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatch
 DATE 6-23-55

APPENDIX G 3/11

TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
1558	520	Disp.	At Helipoint Base	
1602	31		fire heading toward golf course	
1604	90		Might set priorities on helicopter - FMT's @ Noisy Creek fire (Check FMT status at F45) (aircraft left light - off base, enroute w/ bladder bags - discuss)	
1605	520		Can we have one of your SUV crews until we can get a handle on Kahnasta (10-4 are can spare 1 EMT)	
1609	61		Put him on hold for now	
1614	90		Send SUV crew w/ 10 bladder bags & band tool	
1618	31		Going toward golf course	
1621	520		Once gun gang to change clothes (Alvare)	
1623	520		Thought about retardant (11) here - makes a difference	
			North end (Bucket - fuel truck here where do we want him) 10-6	
1628	61		Call Topash & H. Phillips (Topash here, calling Harry)	
1630	90		Retardant available - General Manager Kahnasta	
			said ok to use if needed	
1633	90		Could use more overhead (open to suggestions)	

Department of Interior
Warm Springs Agency
Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE 6-23-85

APPENDIX G 4/11

RE #	TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
	1633	Bear Springs		Arrived on scene	
	1634	520		North side of hot	
	1639			cat operator on its way	
	1643			Fire past Lodge + Hamlet	
	1645			Helicopter problems - sit down	
				lay down	
	1653			Running up hill north of lodge	
	1657			Starovich - near on the fire	
	1658			Have to eat before they go out	
				Lester Butler Has lost in fire	
				#28 on low boy case cats	
	1701	F-71	Disp.	Where do we need Back Packs Pumps	
	1706	22	"	Maybe we can get water drops	
	1710			instead of retardant	
	1717	920		Dispatch	
	1715			Proceed North End of Gold can	
	1718			Permission to use cats to stop	
				fire - canyons	
	1720			22 - Burn strips to River - talking to	

RADIO LOG

Department of Interior
Warm Springs Agency
Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE

APPENDIX 5/11

[illegible]

RADIO LOG

Department of Interior
Warm Springs Agency
Warm Springs, Oregon

S-214

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE 6-23-55

CODE:
LL - Landline Telephone
VB - Verbal Message

E #	TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
	1724	61		Your 4 sev crews coming - we are keeping partial	
	1724	133		Payase crew to dispatch to Kahrasta (10-1/2)	
				Engine 32 enroute Kahrasta	
				North from old.	
	1730	22		Engin. Cat working well - mag	
				get it -	
	1737	"	"	Carl Van enroute to Usg	
				Creek fire.	
				S-211 S-214	
	1744			Poitra on the fire S-211	
				Starovich - do you see fire boss -	
				1745	
	1747			Spot fire. turning cat around.	
				fire running - should make it.	
				Asking	
	1753			Refractant ordered.	
	1754			Bruce Tim enroute with 15 crew members.	
	1756			Investigators on fire.	

APPENDIX G 6/11

RADIO LOG

Department of / prior
Warm Springs Agency
Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE 6-23-55

CODE:
L - Landline - Telephone
V - Verbal Message

TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
1825			NW Corner of Fire	
			Crew stop -	
			Bruce Tomlinson going to fire	
1825	22	Disp.	on top of John Deere, cut some line, if crewing get here will get it around area #14, 15	
1831			C-1 requesting release of	
			57 Jefferson in country	
1837	564	Disp.	out of service - req. stay there for a while longer?	
1838	22	"	only has mobil radio - can we get one to him? check in advance	
1847	22	"	15 crew coming? farm - need to move to be along the road so it doesn't jump it - > ETA for retardant is 1920 with a lead plane.	
1856	LEAD PLANE →		lead plane over fire talking with Starkovich	
1859	22	Disp.	D-8 on top of ridges - 2 cats working towards each other - lead plane clocking area say don't look back so far.	
1915			Dan O'Brien leaving the fire	
1916				
1918	Phillip Shum	Disp	injured eye - his big golf course with North wind	

APPENDIX G 7/11

CODE: LL - Land Telephone
VH - Verbal Message

Department of Interior
Warm Springs Agency
Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE 6-23-55

TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
1918	22	Disp.	A lot of effort on top > check if ok by golf course or if they need anything -	
1919	Disp	golf course	C1 enroute to golf course from lodge. will advise 22 of	
1922	C1	Disp.	golf course looks good - flaming couple of spots in green area.	
1924	104	Disp.	lunches - get count if needed? will bring down also need to check septic tank pumpers for toilet if seen it needs to go back up shores.	
1932	LL Mike Lowery ->	Disp	END for: blawed -> Harry	
1933	REINOLD	Disp -	information re restricted area at Kahmuts	
1941	90	"	Returning to station	
1950	22	"	give them another load, 10 ⁰⁰ and 61	
1956	90	"	in yard in engine 31	
1959	22	"	if we want it moped up - road needs improvement - while cats are up there - pretty sleep.	
1959	Harry ->		ordered 120 men crew for 0500 in morning ->	
2011	Eng 37	Disp	Dan left them at lodge - 10-7 or what? neg. going down by the golf course on the road to check it out -	

RADIO LOG

Department of Interior
Warm Springs Agency
Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE 6-23-85

CODE:
LL - Landline Telephone
VB - Verbal Message

TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
2016	lander	biop	available - needs a ride. if we need him, report to 555	
2018	22	"	someone coming from bear springs with a spare.	
2021	22	"	need drip torches with fuel on 214 road.	
2027	554	"	10-7	
2029	22	"	possible 2-20 men crew - bladder bags - and get a	
2030	" Mike Lowery	"	engine is 2 on top of ridge if possible	
2031	" French	"	Harned? - neg - there's a	
2032	lead 61	"	Mike Lowery trying to call FTS line lowery - already on the phone with Theresa at this time.	
2040	lead 61	"	info on fire - need map here - about 700 to 900 acres.	
2041	" "	"	need tankers - get them out right away before light is gone	
2043	22	"	if we don't need they can return to where they belong	
2047	22	"	need 15-20 headlamps	
2048	BLM	"	looks good cleaning up? - did copy w/ lead 61?	
2057	22	"	Available from BLM for Monday AM - Pinnacles Helicopter - 3 engines (with crews)	
		"	4 people County Rural - sending them back down to	
		"	engineers working from East stringing to west fence line - continuing cat work	

COE: LL - Land Telephone
 VB - Verbal Message

Department of Interior
 Warm Springs Agency
 Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatcher
 DATE 6-23-85

TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
2057	Disp.	22	Released 4 County Rural people, also has 2 Cayuse Crew members going out - Ron Morningstar and Lowell SPIND to meet the rest of crew -	
2105	22	Disp.	Any word on road? - Access road for pumpers -	
2113	Fire camp	"	need 50 lunch ASAP - from kitchen or local?	
2114	"	"	fire camp - need paper & plastic worked on ASAP will be back in 50 lunch within 5 minutes	
			Looking very good - JD - 450 working on west side D-8 Building road	
2132	Lawson	WSPD	fire - pole & grass intersection Harry 3	
2133			informed Harry - Marty + 2 enroute	
2133	Disp			
2136	133	#5825	EMERGENCY TO FIRE Marty	
2140	122		- 7000	
		#5828	Fire out	
2143				
2145	22	Disp	explain to 122 how to get there from 114	

REVISED LOG

Department of Interior
Warm Springs Agency
Warm Springs, Oregon

KOC 555 - Dispatch
DATE 6-23-

6-23-85

TIME	CALLER OR CALLED	STATION	MESSAGE	OPERATOR
2154	22.	555	Five IS Cinedz let of . unburned area . up the hill from the village Piece of line on west side - that he is not	



APPENDIX G 11/11


Lodge Fire

Kah-neetah
Resort



6/23/85











SAFETY ASPECT OF LODGE FIRE

The team spent considerable time reviewing and discussing the events that lead to the injuries on the Lodge Fire. From the written statements, minutes from the Fire and Safety meeting at Kah-nee-ta, personal interviews, etc., it is the opinion of the Review Team that the injuries were a result of an attempt by well-meaning individuals to protect the Lodge, the jobs of the Lodge employees and possibly the lives of the other employees and visitors. We believe that the action was an individual effort and that no one individual directed another to take action. The observance of individuals taking action may have caused others to respond but this was voluntary responses.

The individuals were ill-equipped to take suppression action. The analysis of fire behavior indicates that once the fire crossed the small draw and began its uphill run that even heavy equipment would have been useless. These individuals attempted to suppress ^{the fire} with wet towels and sheets. Even if the suppression effort had been able to stop the fire advance below the lodge prior to it crossing the draw, it is the opinion of the Team that there were not sufficient forces present to prevent the fire from hooking around their control lines. The mid-afternoon winds and the wind generated by the fire itself produced the ^{eratic} ~~exotic~~ fire behavior observed.

Fire suppression experience may have also played a role in the seriousness of the injuries. The fuels were primarily grasses which are usually totally consumed at the flaming edge. The chances of outrunning

this type of fire once it begins its uphill spread are little and none. The best action would be to go back through the flames into the blackend area. One individual took this action and was less seriously injured.

The last item to be discussed is the type of clothing worn by the injured. The majority of the clothing was synthetics. This type of clothing will usually melt before it burns. It is our understanding that much of the injuries were of this nature. Suppression personnel when at all possible should wear natural fiber materials such as cotton or denim, and when available these materials should be treated with a fire resistant solution. These materials will burn, but higher temperatures are required.

Recap of safety portions of report

1. No one was directed to take suppression action. Action was taken voluntarily.
2. Individuals ill-equipped for tasks
 - a. lack of fire behavior knowledge
 - b. lack of fire suppression experience
 - c. improper or inadequate clothing

Following is a synopsis of the events which lead up to the injuring of five Kahneeta Lodge employees and one lodge guest on the Kahneeta Lodge Fire. The injuries occurred on Saturday, June 22, 1985, at approximately 1530.

A small suppression unit; a one ton truck with a slip-on pump package was located at the Village area approximately 1 1/2 miles from the Kahneeta Lodge Resort. The unit was on routine maintenance duty and operated by Loren Thornton and Ed Rouse. They received report of a fire at the Hamlet Housing Complex midway between their location and the Lodge. They travelled to the reported fire location where they were instructed by Robert Dispennett to go to the Kahneeta Lodge and evaluate the fire. They arrived at the Lodge and parked adjacent to the fire hydrant at the delivery entrance (or back side) of the lodge. Upon arriving at the scene, word was relayed to Robert Dispennett to "Get the truck up here," referring to the 1,000 gallon suppression unit which was still at the Hamlet Housing Complex.

Loren stayed with the small suppression unit which was relatively new and had only a new 200-gallon slip-on package attached. No wildfire suppression tools were loaded on this unit yet. He attempted to get the unit pumping only to find out the pump had no prime. Therefore, the only water available was directly from the adjacent hydrant. When Ed Rouse entered the Lodge the guest and employees surrounded him. It appeared they were asking for direction, either because of his past association or his arrival in a fire suppression unit. The situation was threatening and confusing at this time.

When they learned the pump on the slip-on unit would not prime and no wildfire tools (pulaski's, shovels, etc.) were available, someone was told to bring out the sheets and wet them down directly from the hydrant. Loren told the people not to go down to the fire, which at this time appeared to be a very inactive, easily suppressed grass fire. Jim Johnson said, "We can't stand here and do nothing." Ed Rouse dressed in his turn-outs then went over the hill and approximately nine other people including Jim Johnson followed. They were dressed in a variety of clothing fabrics and equipped with only primitive suppression ideas. Their intent was to establish a perimeter around the fire hydrant with hopes of protecting the Kahneeta Lodge; their jobs, a tribal monument, and possibly the lives of the remaining people.

As this small group journeyed down the steep slope, they did not realize the potential for extreme fire behavior and a blow-up which occurred within 30 minutes from the time the fire was reported. The review team strongly believes not one person or event is solely responsible for this tragedy, but individuals reacting to a known enemy, "fire," without the proper tools, training, personal equipment, protection and leadership can be fatal.